US-Venezuela conflict China Diplomacy

Published: 6:00am, 12 Jan 2026

Zheng Yongnian is a leading Chinese political scientist and government adviser, with a focus on the country’s transformation and foreign relations. In his third interview for the Open Questions series, Zheng discusses the “Donroe Doctrine” and its implications for the existing world order – and an emerging one. For other interviews in the series, click here.

On Venezuela, you have noted that the US pivot to Latin America could reshape the regional order and that Donald Trump’s warnings to other countries could lead to profound structural changes. How do you assess those changes, and what could they mean for China?

That involves Trump’s strategic shifts, for which there is a broad consensus in the US, as evidenced by the latest National Security Strategy.

His approach consists of two main points.

The first is consolidating the US sphere of influence in the western hemisphere. He views the presence of other nations, like China and Russia, as a national security threat. However, I don’t think he can or intends to completely seal off the hemisphere from all other countries. We shouldn’t take it to extremes.

The second is offshore balancing.

While strategic contraction has been discussed since the [Barack] Obama era, it has never been truly executed. I think Trump is capable. As a businessman, he is action-oriented and tends to follow through on what he says. His strategic focus, Maga, is domestic-centric with attention to the periphery and the “backyard” – moving from the Monroe Doctrine to what he calls the “Donroe Doctrine”.

After World War II, US interests have been deeply embedded in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Since the US has been a part of those existing orders, its withdrawal will create local chaos. Conversely, its pivot to Latin America – a re-embedding in the region – could cause similar disruption.

Turbulence is likely to be the defining trend of the coming years. Whether the US retreats or advances, significant adjustments will follow.

From this perspective, I see rapid changes occurring on three levels.

First, relations between big powers. Those relations are crucial. Big powers drive major geopolitical shifts, while smaller states have little impact on them. Venezuela definitely won’t be the last target of the US. Just like in Europe, once the war ends, Ukraine also won’t be the last target of Russia.

Since Trump’s second term began, American right-wing think tanks have discussed a tripartite partition of the world. In terms of big powers, Trump is the second to pursue that; the first was [Russian President Vladimir] Putin, who has long been doing it, albeit under different pretexts.

Europeans – nations like Poland – are afraid since they have realised that if Trump compromises with Putin and ends the war by ceding Ukrainian territory, Ukraine will not be Russia’s final objective.

Still, “regional lords” are also asserting themselves, such as Turkey in so-called Turkic-speaking countries. That is why I say we are seeing a feudalisation of the international order, with everyone seeking their own sphere of influence.

We used to think Trump’s talk about annexing Greenland or Canada was a joke, but he genuinely wants them. Still, in my view, he is not entirely without logic. Latin America is the US backyard and is highly dependent on the US, yet it has also become the source of many problems in the US, including drugs, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

The US has not developed Latin America properly after the Monroe Doctrine. The region has long been stuck in the middle-income trap, weak economies and deep social division – extreme pro-American and extreme anti-American factions coexisting. That is why I believe Trump’s intervention is serious – no country can allow its backyard to become a burden.

Trump is not just doing a “corollary” but trying to materialise the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine. While the Venezuela event is a flagrant violation of a nation’s sovereignty, many locals are celebrating and Argentina stands firmly with the US. Trump may intend to, at the very least, consolidate pro-American forces in the region.

With [US Secretary of State] Marco Rubio reportedly poised to become a virtual “viceroy” of Venezuela, a “neocolonialism” is taking shape. Unlike the British Empire, he [Trump] won’t send a legion of bureaucrats but likely will appoint key figures to govern at least during the transition.

Second, relations between big powers and smaller states.

According to the Charter of the United Nations, all states are equal regardless of size. But that is just a theory and principle, which has never been a reality. The issue of how smaller states should live with big powers has never been resolved.

Smaller states need sophisticated diplomatic skills to survive. It is really tough for them. If a small country constantly challenges the giant next door by leveraging another big power, it will definitely end up falling victim.

Direct war among big powers like China, the US and Russia ... is unlikely today due to their respective nuclear prowess and strength in the internet and artificial intelligence.

However, if a Southeast Asian nation draws on the US to challenge China, or a Latin American nation leverages relations with Russia or China to challenge the US, like what Cuba did [with the Soviet Union], this is bound to cause trouble. This is an issue we need to think about again.

The third level concerns the relationship between regional and global orders. The US used to be a global power, but now it is stepping back to act as a regional power, which will be followed by a recalibration of regional and global dynamics.

In the next phase, all the three levels will undergo massive transformation. Those are structural changes, and this era is only just beginning.

Some voices suggest the Trump administration is trying to build an exclusive, unipolar system in the western hemisphere that would reduce China’s reach in the Americas. Others argue that the US action in Venezuela could strengthen a sense of strategic autonomy among Latin American nations and prompt them to seek closer ties with China to balance Washington’s influence. What’s your take on those views?

I don’t quite agree with either of those views, based on historical experience and power politics.

First, is Latin America becoming more autonomous? Absolutely not. On the contrary, it has become more dependent on the US.

Whether Latin American countries can unite is a question. They have various regional associations, but they have never reached genuine unity.

The idea of strategic autonomy might get strengthened among the left in Latin America. But an idea is just an idea – they lack the capacity to execute it.

Second, will Latin America really become an exclusive US sphere that is completely closed off to other powers, turning the “Americas” into an “America”? I also doubt it.

The US is still a capitalist country. American capital won’t only stay in Latin or North America but will still flow to China and Europe.

From the perspective of national security, Trump certainly wants to dominate Latin American affairs but is not trying to turn the region into a private US territory. These are two different things.

From this angle, I believe there is still room for negotiation and deal-making between major powers like China and the US.

If the US were to completely exclude Chinese business from Latin America, what would happen to US interests in East Asia? It’s a matter of reciprocity. Trump speaks the language of power politics, and the current state of China-US relations is also the product of power politics.

The future still holds a lot of fluidity.

We need to analyse [the impact of the Venezuela attack] on China objectively. While Chinese interests will certainly be affected, the US lacks the capacity to fully squeeze China out of Latin America. If it did so, China could mirror the move to exclude American interests from East Asia, which is also impossible.

Interactions between big powers will continue; they won’t disappear. But it is just that smaller states will be at a disadvantage.

Latin America’s right-wing factions appear to be aligning themselves more closely with US hawks. What are your thoughts on this? What impact could that have on China’s future strategic options and prospects there?

Latin America’s right wing has always maintained good relations with the US. Many interests of Latin America’s right wing are rooted in the US.

Under a dependent development model, many large corporations and elites benefit from their connections with the US. The nationalisation policies of Venezuela’s previous leadership, which seized assets of the US, were one of the reasons Washington took action.

There will be some impact on China [due to the right wing] but that should not be exaggerated. China’s relationship with Latin America is about mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation without geopolitical calculations. Right-wing governments may even place greater emphasis on commercial ties.

The so-called Chinese geopolitics is, in my opinion, a Western exaggeration. What China is doing there consists mainly of livelihood-oriented projects – the Belt and Road Initiative, for instance. Energy trade is entirely natural; China needs resources for its development and those countries need to export. The same applies to agriculture.

As the Chinese and US leaders might meet at least three times this year, I believe many matters in China-US relations can be handled well.

Of course, the abduction of Nicolas Maduro was a flagrant violation of international law. China has officially protested and called for his release.

Meanwhile, China is pragmatic: regardless of whether a government is left- or right-wing, it will engage, such as the example of Argentina.

Many of China’s economic activities [in Latin America] cannot be easily replaced by the US. The competition in Latin America is not a zero-sum game, just as the broader China-US relationship is not zero-sum either.

How might the Venezuela event influence broader China-US strategic competition? Has the 21st-century great-power rivalry entered a new era?

We have now entered another phase of reconstructing the international order.

The United Nations system certainly is still here, but it has become irrelevant to reality. According to the theory of international public goods, big powers will play the leading role in establishing international rules or order, while smaller states are largely powerless in this regard but merely act as free-riders.

That is why China-US relations are so crucial. Trump used the term “G2” explicitly before the summit [with Chinese President Xi Jinping] in Busan last year. We don’t need to speculate on what Trump exactly meant by invoking the concept. But if you look objectively at economic, military and other dimensions of strength, the world is de facto G2.

If the G2 can cooperate, a great deal can still be accomplished. If the G2 cannot cooperate or resolve problems but falls into conflict, it will become mutual suicide.

The US is now itself a major energy power. [In the Venezuela action] energy is certainly an important factor, but it is not the only one. Energy acts like a fishhook – providing sufficient incentive to motivate American capital to get involved as an actor.

Will Trump send troops into Venezuela? That is not his intention. He does not do things that get [American] people killed. This time there were no Americans killed, so he is quite pleased. He has changed the previous strategy of the US. Even if that involves colonialism, it is a new type but not the old style of the past.

Some developments still need to be observed over time – we should not rush to conclusions. Also, we should not underestimate Trump’s intelligence.

As you mentioned, the Trump administration is pursuing a path of “neocolonialism”. Is that likely to be a broader deterrent or have a chilling effect on other countries? What are the risks for China?

The crisis serves as a warning to smaller countries around China not to view the US as their patron and constantly challenge China.

Trump has been unable to resolve the Ukraine conflict. Most likely, he would acknowledge Russia’s sphere of influence in Europe, which again comes at the expense of smaller states.

Smaller countries need to be extremely careful in the future. They should not provoke great powers and avoid hastily choosing sides or relying on one major power to counter another. Such a trick can only be played up to a limit. Once that limit is crossed, falling victim is certain.

The Belt and Road Initiative is not a geopolitical project. Over so many years, China has not sought to develop geopolitical interests through it. It is not about requiring participating countries to follow China. Rather, it is about developing economic and trade relations, and it is not an anti-US project. To this day, the initiative remains open to the US.

While economic aspects may be somewhat affected, the initiative will continue to develop nonetheless.

I do not believe that the US would intervene across all belt and road countries, as that would be completely opposite to Trump’s original intent.

If Trump’s national security strategy is retrenchment and a focus on the western hemisphere, then it is not specifically aimed at China’s belt and road. If the US were truly intent on undermining the belt and road, it would amount to a return to the path of renewed American imperial expansion, which would contradict the logic of Trump’s approach. I do not think this is realistic, and in the end it would only lead to a faster decline of the US.

It is possible to see further deepening of China-US relations this year. The economies of China and the US are highly complementary. The US has comparative advantages in areas such as basic research, finance, producer services and agricultural products. China has advantages in applied technology, infrastructure and demand for agricultural products and software.

But the current problem is the relatively low political trust between the two countries, so that many issues are framed in terms of national security, and once everything is securitised, business becomes impossible.

When the two leaders met in Busan, they emphasised that the business relationship is the stabilising anchor. And there were still hundreds of billions of dollars in trade last year. I believe that as political trust increases, China-US relations will move in a more positive direction.

But adjustments are needed. China may need to adjust some of its work in the western hemisphere. Similarly, the US is also making adjustments in Europe and in Asia. In the future world, if it is tripartite, all parties will need to make certain adjustments. This is a process of reordering.

Will the Venezuela crisis and the US arms sales to Taiwan add new uncertainties to leader-level interactions this year?

Struggle and cooperation are normal, especially under Trump.

For [former US president] Joe Biden, or politicians from both the Democratic and Republican parties who are more ideologically driven, the impact might be greater. But with someone like Trump, who is a power-oriented politician, the impact is relatively smaller.

The China-US relationship today is not the same as before. There used to be many factors like ideology but it is now defined by power politics. China and the US have recognised the strength of each other. When China does something, the US protests; when the US does something, China protests. This is daily life – business as usual. Where cooperation is possible, cooperation continues.

There is an understanding in the US among those born in the 1980s that China has already risen and the only option for the US is to learn how to coexist. Therefore, the struggles between both sides, such as on the Taiwan issue, are unlikely to seriously obstruct the bilateral relationship.

Struggle and cooperation are two sides of a coin. Without struggle, there can be no cooperation; with cooperation as a foundation, struggle will not lead to a total collapse – unlike the US-Soviet case.

You noted that the post-war international order has effectively broken down and with the world entering a more anarchic phase, nations have to consider how best to protect their own interests. Is power politics – or even jungle logic – re-emerging as a dominant force in international relations? Would you see this as a structural shift?

It is a cyclical change.

For most of human history, international relations have operated based on the law of jungle.

Great powers are the makers of the law. What they practice is rule by law, not rule of law. International law is a “weapon of weaker states” while big powers often stand above it, as the US, the Soviet Union and the British Empire have done historically.

The US has never genuinely followed the “rules-based” international order, with well presented American narratives.

So we should not assume that the earlier world was not governed by jungle logic. For big powers, it has always been a jungle. History shows us this again and again. It’s cyclical.

But there is no need to be overconcerned. What we are witnessing is not the absence of order, but a process of rebuilding order.

The future order, in my view, is actually quite interesting. Russia’s modern historical entanglements with Europe raise the question of how its regional and international order is being shaped.

At present, there is no single international order – only the orders of individual great powers. That is why I describe the situation as a kind of “feudalisation”, where each power governs its own domain according to its own rules.

Going forward, the question is whether interactions and bargaining among these different orders would eventually produce a new international order. That remains a possibility.

How do you think China can respond to this evolving situation? Can multipolarity be consolidated, and if so, how?

China’s current approach is actually very smart. Even though the UN-based order has become less relevant, and institutions like the WTO are no longer as effective as before, China is not looking to “set up a separate kitchen”.

The Western-led order remains useful. Free trade originated in the West and was championed by the US, but Trump has chosen to throw it away for domestic reasons. China, however, has simply picked it up and carried it forward.

China’s approach is inclusive, marked by its opening-up policies. China has become the most steadfast defender of the free-trade system.

In this sense, China, as a non-Western country, has inherited and continued many elements of the Western legacy. I think this is a very clever move with a lower cost.

You said major powers like the US and Russia seemed to be dividing the world into spheres of influence. Where does China stand, and how should it respond? Will this shift change much with future US leaders?

I believe the US adjustment is not solely driven by Trump’s personal views –though he does hold a 19th-century imperialist worldview – but also by national circumstances in the US. If the US continued its previous overextension of expansion, it would face even greater trouble. So this shift has its rationale. However, such a large-scale adjustment harms vested interests in the US, which is why elites from both the Democratic and Republican parties dislike it.

Will everything reverse after Trump – say, under Democrats or post-Trump Republicans? I think it’s unlikely. Trump’s overall judgment is probably correct, and only specific methods might change. Fundamentally, the US must retrench strategically; failure to do so would spell serious trouble. This is reflected in the National Security Strategy, which, in my view, largely embodies ideas from younger generations like [Vice-President J.D.] Vance and Rubio, incorporating Trump’s actions into their framework.

Setting aside partisan struggles, the US Gen Z view China and international affairs very differently from the Cold War generation. This is a major trend. There will be fluctuations, but a structural return to the post-World War II or [former US president Ronald] Reagan-era state is impossible – the US simply lacks the strength.

China is open and inclusive – it will not join any effort to carve up the world. China has never pursued this. China’s current focus is on issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea, but we approach these from the perspective of sovereignty and core interests, not geopolitics. Resolving the Taiwan and South China Sea issues is about China’s sovereign rights; we are not trying to expel the US from the western Pacific.

Looking back at the millennia-long system mislabelled by the West as “tributary” in China, it was entirely different from Roman-era Western practices. Western historians like [John King] Fairbank couldn’t find an equivalent concept, so they imposed Western frameworks on China. In reality, China’s system involved ceremonial gift-giving – you might offer the emperor the equivalent of $5, and he would give you $10 in return. After the ceremony, China essentially provided unilateral trade openness. China has no tradition of Western-style colonies, nor a true tributary imposition. The two are completely different.

Thus, today, while defending its core interests, China will neither join the ranks of those redividing the world nor close itself off, much less claim “Asia for Chinese”.

China’s interests are global – it will continue to engage outward without geopolitical calculations that affect other nations’ security.

Compared to other UN Security Council powers, China avoids overseas military action – this should help its image, yet it still faces challenges to effectively protect its overseas interests. What are your thoughts on this?

China’s philosophy is rooted in Confucianism and soft power; our ancient wisdom holds that true martial strength lies in stopping war – or zhi ge wei wu. This is evident in our no-first-use nuclear policy – we never initiate aggression.

But in today’s world, should we rethink this philosophy? When you possess hard power, you must use it skillfully. Hard power is essential. Of course, we must not mimic the US and the Soviet Union. But as China’s interests extend globally, is soft power alone sufficient to protect them? Clearly not.

We need to draw lessons from the histories of Britain, the US and the Soviet Union: employ hard power wisely – not avoid it entirely, but use it to safeguard our own interests while also promoting the interests of other countries. This is what I call “Tianxia View 2.0”.

The core of the traditional Tianxia concept is correct: when pursuing your own interests, you must also consider the interests of others. This reflects the spirit of China’s ancient scholar-officials – concern for all under heaven. Tianxia is not merely soft power; without hard power as its foundation, soft power is unreliable. People will not respect you if you cannot solve real problems.

In 1820, China still had the world’s largest GDP. Just 20 years later, in 1840, it was defeated by a small Britain – who respected China then?

China has successfully stood firm in four rounds of [trade] struggle against the US. This has built our confidence, our resolve and earned us respect. Respect is won through struggle – through the skilful use of hard power. No fear, no respect.

Some analysts have said the US operation in Venezuela could serve as a reference for Beijing to address the pro-independence forces in Taiwan. How do you view that?

The social media buzz about Trump capturing the Venezuelan president is loud, but this is far from the first time the US has done something like this. They’ve carried out similar operations before – Panama with [former leader Manuel] Noriega, for example – but we’ve largely forgotten them.

Of course, China can study and learn from it. In my view, this was one of the most efficient operations in history. Trump himself called it “perfect” – a stark contrast to [former US president] Jimmy Carter’s disastrous Iran hostage rescue attempt.

That said, when it comes to military tactics, the Taiwan issue must be treated separately. Taiwan is fundamentally different: it involves Chinese people on both sides. We’ve long held the principle that “Chinese don’t fight Chinese”. Our policy is to prevent independence while pursuing “one country, two systems”, which by its very nature implies a peaceful resolution and eventual reunification.

At a tactical, micro level, however, could a decapitation strike be considered? Certainly, I think everywhere has people who consider such options. The real questions are feasibility and whether it can actually succeed.

This is a US midterm election year. In talks with [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky last year, Trump quipped about cancelling the 2028 elections if the US were at war. Do you see a link between US domestic politics and the timing of the Venezuela operation?

It’s difficult to claim the Venezuela operation was primarily timed for the midterms. It had been in planning for a long time and is indeed a big issue – illegal immigration and drugs were central to Trump from the very beginning of his second term.

The operation will certainly have an impact on US domestic politics. However, in my view, unless the Democrats achieve a major resurgence, this won’t fundamentally alter the broader trajectory of the midterms. Despite protests [against the operation] the overall direction is unlikely to change.

We shouldn’t idealise Americans – they are just as susceptible to nationalist sentiment as any other people. Imperialistic actions like [the operation] can stir American nationalism.

So yes, domestic politics may have some influence, but it won’t largely derail Trump’s broader foreign policy strategy. If the operation is seen as successful, it could even rally more support by awakening nationalist feelings.

Americans have strong nationalist emotions – evident in their 19th-century territorial expansion era – and often criticise nationalism in others while exhibiting it more intensely themselves.

Trump has expressed admiration for US presidents from the territorial expansion period.

Absolutely. This is especially true when it comes to the drug crisis, which has profoundly harmed American society. Fentanyl, for instance, is a major issue in US-China relations because it has caused so many young American lives to be lost. Trump does show some genuine concern for these social and humanitarian problems in America – it’s not purely a political calculation.

Of course, as a politician, he will leverage these issues, but to most ordinary Americans, he appears to be acting in the country’s interest. Protests exist, but they won’t shift the overall picture – his base of support remains solid.

Orange Wang Jane, Cai in Beijing and Meredith Chenin Hong Kong

Published: 6:00 am, 12 Jan 2026